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I. INTRODUCTION
Cars, rice farming, coal mining, power plants, and cattle belching all have
one thing in common: they emit greenhouse gases.1 In fact, when measuring
greenhouse gas emissions, “[a] herd of cattle belching can be worse than a
highway full of Hummers.”2 It seems strange and somewhat unlikely, but
due to the diversity in the types of greenhouse gases that can be emitted,
greenhouse gas emissions can come from numerous sources; including cars
and power plants emitting carbon dioxide and cows belching methane.
Greenhouse gases are not just varied in means of production, they are also
paradoxical. A paradox is defined as something “that is seemingly
contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is . . . true.”3 Greenhouse
gases are one such paradox: “[t]he greenhouse effect keeps the earth warm
and habitable . . . [and] is clearly a good thing. But the enhanced greenhouse
effect means even more of the sun’s heat is trapped [in the earth’s
atmosphere], causing global temperatures to rise,” which is clearly a bad
thing.4 Greenhouse gases, therefore, are necessary to life on Earth as they
warm the earth’s surface and, by this means, make the earth inhabitable.5
However, “as the concentrations of these gases continue to increase . . . the
Earth’s temperature is climbing [significantly] above past levels.”6 Among
other things, this results in, an increased frequency of storms, droughts, and
floods, an increased danger to coastal areas due to the rise of sea levels, as
well as a surge in diseases throughout the world.7 Therefore, it seems
greenhouse gases cannot be eliminated completely, and yet, they cannot
continue to be produced at the current rate.
Greenhouse gas emissions have, in fact, drastically increased throughout
time, with “[l]evels of several important greenhouse gases . . . increas[ing]
by about twenty-five percent since large-scale industrialization began around
150 years ago.”8 This surge has continued in recent times, as measured by
1

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION
– AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 34–35 (2008).
2
Id. at 35.
3
Paradox Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/par
adox (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
4
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 36.
5
Climate Change Basics, EPA U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY (June 14, 2012), http://
www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html.
6
Id.
7
SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4–5 (1999).
8
Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, and Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 2,
2004), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html.
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which reports that
between the years of 1970 and 2004 greenhouse gas emissions have
increased by 70%.9
The IPCC has also found that although some mitigation policies have
been effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, they have not yet had
the effect of counteracting the steady increase of those emissions.10 If
current international measures for mitigating greenhouse gases are not
modified, the IPCC has projected that greenhouse gas emissions will
continue to increase during the next several decades.11 Adding to the
complexity of the situation, modifying current measures cannot be
accomplished by any country acting on its own, as no single country is
currently producing more than one-fifth of the world’s greenhouse gas
emissions.12 Only a global solution would have a significant impact on
reducing the levels of these gases.13
The international community has taken note of the greenhouse gas
problem and has undertaken several different approaches to address the
issue. The Kyoto Protocol is one such approach. The Protocol is an
international agreement that seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on a
global scale.14 The Protocol attempts to reduce emissions by setting binding
emission targets for its Annex I Member States, composed of thirty-seven
developed countries and the European Union.15 The Kyoto Protocol holds
these countries to binding commitments by requiring them to reduce their
greenhouse emissions by an average of 5% against 1990 levels, over the
period of 2008–2012.16 The Protocol also encourages, but does not commit,

9

TERRY BARKER ET AL., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 3 (B. Metz
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4wg3/ar4-wg3-sp
m.pdf.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 4.
12
S. GUPTA & DENNIS A. TIRPAK, Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 745, 768 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/as
sessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-chapter13.pdf.
13
Id.
14
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
15
See id. art. 3 (referring to Annex B of the Protocol, which lists the emission targets set for
Annex I countries).
16
Id.
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non-Annex I countries, composed of mainly developing nations, to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions.17
The Kyoto Protocol thus symbolizes the world’s realization that
greenhouse gas emission levels are an international issue that must be
addressed on a global scale.18 In spite of this realization, the Protocol, until
recently when reinstated for another five-year period during the Durban
Conference, was set to expire in 2012 with several of the major Annex I
countries refusing to commit to a second period at all.19 Additionally, the
world’s two biggest greenhouse gas emitters, the United States and China,
were never parties to the Kyoto Protocol and are not parties to the five-year
extension The United States seemed reluctant to sign on at all.20 The
unwillingness of the world’s biggest emitters to sign on to the Protocol,
coupled with the fact that some of the world’s largest emitters are developing
countries who have no binding commitments under the Protocol, has
prompted many critics to label the Kyoto Protocol a failure.21 According to
one critic: “If cutting global carbon emissions was [the Kyoto Protocol’s]
aim, the UN scheme has failed.”22
The lack of a significant and effective international agreement on the
reduction of greenhouse gases is a huge issue. In order to fight climate
change, and specifically to reduce greenhouse emission levels, there must be
a global consensus.23 Without international cooperation it is difficult to see
how any significant impact upon greenhouse gas levels will be realized as
“no single country emits more than approximately 20% of global emissions,”
thus making it evident that an effective solution must involve the global
community.24

17
See id. art. 12 (establishing a mechanism for non-Annex I countries to achieve sustainable
development and using the term “developing country Parties” to describe those benefiting from
the mechanism).
18
Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (follow “Kyoto Protocol”
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2012).
19
See Launching the Green Climate Fund, in United Nations Convention on Climate
Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties at Its 17th Sess., 55, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15,
2012), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.
20
See id. (noting a five to eight year extension period for the Kyoto Protocol); UN Climate
Talks: Pretty Basic, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2011.
21
See, e.g., UN Climate Talks: Pretty Basic, supra note 20.
22
Id.
23
See GUPTA & TIRPAK, supra note 12 (stating that “successful solutions will need to
engage multiple countries”).
24
Id.
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Part II of this Note considers why greenhouse gas emissions are
detrimental to the environment and must be controlled. It details how
greenhouse gas emissions are produced, how they affect the environment,
and why they are so harmful. Part III will examine the original Kyoto
Protocol and its goals and initiatives. This part will detail the Protocol’s
structure, focusing on its “common but differentiated responsibilities”
principle,”25 its binding nature, and the market-based mechanisms it has
employed to reduce greenhouse emissions. Part IV will briefly touch on the
international debate over the Protocol’s effectiveness, address the
implications of the Durban Conference, which has re-implemented the
original Kyoto agreement for five more years, and then take the stance that a
new and refreshed Kyoto agreement is absolutely necessary. Part V will
conclude by making suggestions on how to restructure this new agreement in
order to incentivize countries to sign a new protocol and establish a strong
global commitment to reducing greenhouse gas levels and fighting climate
change.
II. GREENHOUSE GASES
Since the beginning of pre-historic times, the world’s population, and thus
its activity, has continually increased. This burst of human activity has
resulted in an increase of various human by-products, including the emission
of greenhouse gases.26 In fact, in the last century the rise in human activity
has resulted in a significant increase of greenhouse gases and, thus, a
substantial change in the earth’s atmosphere and climate.27
Greenhouse gases can be emitted both naturally and via human activity.28
Emissions can occur naturally through sources such as “animal and plant
respiration, volcanic eruptions, and ocean-atmosphere exchange.”29 They
can also occur as a result of human activity, through the “combustion of
fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas in power plants, automobiles, industrial
facilities and other sources.”30 In fact, the majority of greenhouse gas
emissions occur as a result of fossil fuel combustion coming from the
25

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 10.
Causes of Climate Change, EPA U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climat
echange/science/causes.html (last visited June 28, 2012).
27
Id.
28
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 (recognizing that greenhouse gas emissions can come from
rice farming, petroleum drilling, coal mining, animal defecation, and cattle belching).
29
Causes of Climate Change, supra note 26.
30
Nuclear Energy and the Environment, NEI: NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/
resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/protectingtheenvironment/factsheet/nuclearenergyandtheen
vironment/?page=1 (last visited June 11, 2012).
26
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operation of cars, aircrafts, and other machines.31 Thus, greenhouse gases
come from a wide variety of both natural and unnatural sources.
Regardless of their source, greenhouse gases operate by trapping heat in
the Earth’s atmosphere.32 Generally, if these gases are not present, when
sunlight hits the Earth’s surface it is released back into space as infrared
radiation.33 However, when greenhouse gases are present in the atmosphere,
they “absorb this infrared radiation and trap its heat in the atmosphere.”34
The effect of this absorption is to warm the earth’s surface as well as the
lower portion of the earth’s atmosphere.35
Greenhouse gases, once emitted, can remain in the atmosphere “for tens
to hundreds of years.”36 This longevity coupled with the steady rise of
emissions, has been deemed responsible for the global increase in average
temperatures during the twentieth century.37 Scientists predict that if
greenhouse gas emission levels continue to increase at current levels “by the
middle of the next century the Earth's global temperature may be 1 to 3°
Celsius higher than today.”38 Although an increase of several degrees
Celsius may seem insignificant, it becomes more ominous when compared to
the fact that “the difference in global average temperature between an ice age
and an interglacial period like we are in now. . . is a mere five to six degrees
Celsius.”39 Therefore, it is evident that a seemingly small change in global
temperatures can lead to drastic differences in the environment.40
Complicating the issue further is that these increases in greenhouse gases
do not necessarily correlate to the size of the population within a certain
country, making it hard to regulate among countries based only on
differences in population.41 Rather greenhouse emissions can be related
either to the level of industrialization and development in a country or to the
31

OBERTHÜR & OTT, supra note 7, at 7.
Causes of Climate Change, supra note 26.
33
Energy and the Environment Explained: Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=environment_about_ghg (last updated
Apr. 12, 2011).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES
9 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/pdfs/climateindicators-full.pdf.
37
Id. at 2.
38
M. Pidwirny, The Greenhouse Effect, in FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY (2d
ed. 2009), available at http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/7h.html.
39
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 37.
40
Id.
41
KEVIN A. BAUMERT, TIM HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS:
GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 11–12 (Dec. 2005), available
at http://pdf.wri.org/navigating_numbers.pdf.
32
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sheer size of the population in the country.42 In fact, “[m]ost of the
largest . . . emitters have large economies, large populations, or both.”43 As
a prime example of this issue, the United States “produced about 19% of
global carbon dioxide emissions . . . in 2008 . . . and 18% in 2009,” and yet it
accounted for only 5% of the world’s population.44
Despite developed countries like the United States producing high levels
of greenhouse gases,45 studies predict that, “[m]uch of the increase
in . . . emissions is expected to occur in the developing world where
emerging economies, including China and India, fuel economic development
with fossil energy.”46 Thus it is not just the developed and industrialized
world that threatens to contribute heavily to the greenhouse gas problem, but
also the developing world, which is burning fossil fuels at an increased rate
in order to jumpstart its economic development.
III. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement, adopted in Kyoto,
Japan, on December 11, 1997, that has attempted to deal with the issue of
greenhouse gas emissions.47 The agreement entered into force on February
16, 2005,48 and currently includes 194 countries and the European Union as
parties to the Protocol.49 The Protocol aims to deal with six specific
greenhouse gases: (1) carbon dioxide; (2) methane; (3) nitrous oxide; (4)
hydrofluorocarbons; (5) perfluorocarbons; and (6) sulphur hexafluoride.50
Of the six gases covered, carbon dioxide is by far the most prevalent in the
atmosphere, with 76.7% of global greenhouse gas emissions being attributed
to it.51

42

Id.
Id.
44
Energy and the Environment Explained: Outlook for Future Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=environment_outlook_f or_emiss
ions (last updated Sept. 20, 2011).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18.
48
Id.
49
Essential Background: Basic Facts & Figures, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/basic facts_figures/items/6246.php
(follow “Basic Facts & Figures” hyperlink) (last visited June 29, 2012).
50
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Fact Sheet: The Need
for Mitigation 1, 1 (2009) [hereinafter The Need for Mitigation], available at http://unfccc.int/
files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_mitigation.pdf.
51
Id.
43
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The Kyoto Protocol is linked to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),52 an international treaty adopted
on May 9, 1992, that entered into force on March 21, 1994.53 The ultimate
goal of the UNFCCC is “to stabili[z]e greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with
the climate system.”54 The Kyoto Protocol was later created as a
complement to the UNFCCC and was approved at the 3rd COP.55
Although the Kyoto Protocol and its founding Convention are
counterparts of one another, they differ in that the UNFCCC simply
encourages developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions,
while the Protocol commits them to doing so.56 Specifically, under Article 3,
the Kyoto Protocol commits those countries designated as Annex I countries
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5% below 1990 levels over the
period of 2008–2012.57 These Annex I countries consist of forty-one
developed countries as well as the European Union.58
The Kyoto Protocol, like its founding Convention, the UNFCCC,
differentiates between developed and developing countries by utilizing the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.59 This principle,
detailed most clearly in the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, states:
In view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradation, States have common but differentiated
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies

52
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC], available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
53
Issues in the Negotiation Process: A Brief History of the Climate Change Process,
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/cop7/issu
es/briefhistory.html (last visited June 29, 2012).
54
Introduction to the UNFCCC and Its Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FWK. CONV. ON
CLIM. CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/press/fact_sheets/items/4978.php (last visited June 29, 2012).
55
Id.
56
Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18.
57
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3, para. 1.
58
List of Annex I Countries to the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FWK. CONV. ON CLIM.
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php (last visited
June 29, 2012).
59
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 10.
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place on the global environment and of the technologies and
financial resources they command.60
This principle therefore strives to hold developed countries to a higher
standard, as its drafters believe that those societies and their by-products
have caused more impact on the global environment than those of developing
nations.61
The UNFCCC took this common but differentiated principle even further
by stating that developed nations are not only responsible for reducing their
emissions, but they must also provide funding and resources to assist
developing country parties with the costs of compliance.62 Therefore, under
the UNFCCC, developed countries are not only charged with the
responsibility of mitigating their own greenhouse gas emissions, but they
must also help fund developing countries in adhering to their obligations.
The common but differentiated responsibilities principle was later
incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol as well. As a practical matter, this
principle resulted in the Kyoto Protocol member countries being divided into
two groups: Annex I and non-Annex I countries.63 Developing countries, or
non-Annex I countries, have not made binding commitments to reduce
greenhouse emissions, while developed countries, or Annex I countries, have
agreed to:
● Specific binding emission targets to be achieved in the
2008–2012 commitment period . . .
● Targets [that] can be achieved by domestic action and by
the use of international market mechanisms.64
Therefore, Annex I countries are committed to binding targets while
developing countries, in recognition of the fact that they have not contributed
as much to the greenhouse gas problem, have made no commitments
whatsoever.
Annex I countries that have signed the Protocol are expected to meet their
binding greenhouse gas emissions targets mainly via national measures.65
60

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz.,
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1(vol. I), 31 I.L.M. 874 (June 14, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
61
Compare id. (speaking of the responsibility of developed nations), with id. princ. 6
(calling for special attention the needs of developing nations).
62
UNFCCC, supra note 52, arts. 4(2)(a), 4(3).
63
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14.
64
The Need for Mitigation, supra note 50, at 4.
65
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(a).
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National measures are detailed in Article 2(1)(a) of the Protocol and include,
but are not limited to, the following: enhancing energy efficiency, protecting
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs, promoting sustainable forms of
agriculture, researching new forms of renewable energy, phasing out
incentives and tax deductions for all greenhouse gas emitting sectors,
encouraging reform in those sectors, as well as generally taking steps to limit
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.66
Although Annex I countries are to use these national measures in order to
meet their targets, the Kyoto Protocol also affords them, and in some cases
non-Annex I countries, the opportunity to meet “their targets by way of three
market-based mechanisms”:
[i] Emissions trading
[ii] Clean development mechanism (CDM)
[iii] Joint implementation.67
The emission trading mechanism set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol created a new commodity.68 The emissions trading mechanism
allows those countries that have accepted greenhouse gas targets, or Annex I
countries, to sell or buy additional emission units if they have units to spare
or need more units.69 This mechanism, however, does not apply to nonAnnex I countries.70
The second mechanism is the clean development mechanism (CDM),
which is detailed in Article 12 of the Protocol.71 This mechanism allows
countries with binding targets to implement emission-reducing projects in
developing countries and “use the certified emission reductions [CERs]
accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.”72 These
projects must be registered and are issued CERs only if approved.73
The CDM allows countries to register and accrue credits for numerous
types of projects with the exception of projects involving nuclear power and

66

Id.
Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18.
68
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 17.
69
Id.
70
See id. (discussing Annex B countries, which are also Annex I countries, without
mention of developing nations).
71
Id. art. 12.
72
Id. art. 12(3)(b).
73
What Is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)?, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011), available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/26/clean-development-mechanism/.
67
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deforestation.74 This mechanism, like the other two, is utilized to help
Annex I countries meet their targets.75 However, a key difference between
the CDM and the other two market-based mechanisms is that the CDM’s
purpose is to allow both Annex I and non-Annex I countries to participate.76
The CDM accomplishes this goal by assisting non-Annex I parties in
achieving sustainable development while also helping Annex I countries
comply with their emission targets.77 The CDM’s inclusion of all countries
allows “[d]eveloping countries [to] benefit from new funding opportunities,
and industrialized economies . . . to meet their reduction targets at a lower
cost.”78 The CDM is the first global investment scheme of its kind,79 and it
has registered 4,297 projects thus far, with 95 projects currently requesting
registration.80 It is seen as by far the most successful of the three
mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol.81
The final mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is the joint implementation
mechanism, detailed in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.82 The joint
implementation mechanism allows Annex I countries to invest in greenhouse
gas reducing projects in other Annex I countries in order to earn emission
reduction units that are counted towards their binding emission targets.83
To ensure that Annex I countries adhere to their binding greenhouse gas
emissions targets, the Kyoto Protocol also maintains a compliance
mechanism.84 This mechanism is “designed to strengthen the Protocol’s
environmental integrity, support the carbon market’s credibility and ensure
transparency of accounting by Parties.”85 In effect, the compliance

74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Rolf H. Weber & Aline Darbellay, Regulation and Financial Intermediation in the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 273 (2010).
79
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechani
sm/items/2718.php (last visited June 29, 2012).
80
CDM in Numbers, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html (last visited June 29, 2012).
81
What Is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)?, supra note 73.
82
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6; Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanis
ms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php (last visited June 29, 2012).
83
Joint Implementation, supra note 82.
84
An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_
protocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last visited June 29, 2012).
85
Id.
75
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mechanism and its two branches are to thoroughly assess the performance of
all Annex I parties.
The Protocol’s compliance mechanism consists of a Compliance
Committee that is subdivided into a facilitative branch and an enforcement
branch.86 Each branch is composed of ten members: five from the UN
official regions–Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and others, one from a small island
developing state, two from Annex I States,; and two from non-Annex I
States.87
Each branch also has its own separate functions: “the facilitative branch
aims to provide advice and assistance to Parties in order to promote
compliance, whereas the enforcement branch has the responsibility to
determine consequences for Parties not meeting their commitments.”88 The
power allocated to the facilitative branch allows it not only to advise
countries on how to achieve their targets and reduce emissions, but also gives
it the power to help flag potential non-compliance.89 In contrast, the
enforcement branch not only notes a Party’s non-compliance but also
determines a course of action to be taken to remedy the non-compliance.90
In order to determine compliance, the two branches of the Compliance
Committee mainly base their determinations on reports from experts,
subsidiary bodies, member Parties, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.91
IV. KYOTO PROTOCOL ISSUES AND EXPIRATION
Through its mechanisms, both market-based and compliance, the Kyoto
Protocol has aimed to combat the problem of climate change by reducing
greenhouse gas emissions on a global scale. However, the Protocol has hit
some significant bumps along the way. One of its most serious setbacks
occurred when the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States,
refused to ratify the Protocol, stating that complying with the Protocol
“would harm the [U.S.] economy and [that the Protocol] is flawed by the
lack of restrictions on emissions by China and India.”92 Additionally, there
86

Id.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Bush: Kyoto Treaty Would Have Hurt Economy, MSNBC.COM (June 30, 2005), http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8422343/ns/politics/t/bush-kyoto-treaty-would-have-hurt-economy/#.
ToiEjc2S7Og.
87
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have been many criticisms that the targets set in the Protocol are insufficient
and will not result in any substantial reduction of greenhouse gas emissions,
with some critics going so far as to state that “[e]ven if it were implemented
at 100% effectiveness, the Kyoto Protocol barely represents any progress at
all, both because its reduction targets are low and emissions in developing
countries will continue to grow unchecked.”93
Though the effectiveness of the agreement is highly debated,94 it can
hardly be refuted that the Kyoto Protocol has prompted a global conversation
on climate change and greenhouse emissions. Even in its initial phases, the
Protocol was seen as “an important first step towards a truly global emission
reduction regime that will stabilize [greenhouse gas] emissions, and
provide . . . the essential architecture for any future international agreement
on climate change.”95
Until recently, the Kyoto Protocol was set to expire in 2012,96 with
neither a concrete plan to reinvigorate it for a second commitment period nor
another agreement to take its place, thus leaving the international community
without an environmental agreement.97 Additionally, three of the major
countries that signed the original commitment, Japan, Russia, and Canada,
have refused to take part in a second commitment period unless the Protocol
is modified to bind China and the United States.98 In an attempt to solve
these issues and help find a global consensus on how to reinvigorate and
restructure the Kyoto Protocol, several international conferences have been
held.
The first attempt at reinvigorating the Kyoto Protocol occurred at the
fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) at the Copenhagen
Conference in December 2009.99 The Conference was attended by
93
Eric Bond, The Kyoto Protocol, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, http://clim
atechange.sea.ca/kyoto_protocol.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2003).
94
UN Climate Talks: Pretty Basic, supra note 20.
95
Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18.
96
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3, para. 1 (setting overall emission reduction targets
for Annex I countries with an end year of 2012).
97
See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen,
Den., Dec. 7–18, 2009. Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Parties at Its 15th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord],
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/605/63/PDF/G1060563.pdf?
OpenElement (recognizing the continued need for reduced global emissions in all countries
and the additional reductions that will be required of Annex I countries already party to the
Kyoto Protocol).
98
Jim Efstathiou Jr., Climate Talks Open in Panama with Calls to Extend Kyoto Accord,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-01/
climate-talks-open-in-panama-with-calls-to-extend-kyoto-accord.html.
99
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 97 (committing “to enable . . . sustained implementation
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approximately 120 heads of state, and was seen as “rais[ing] climate change
policy to the highest political level.”100 However, though hopes were high
for the Copenhagen Conference, it concluded with only the signing of a
political agreement, the Copenhagen Accord, negotiated by approximately
twenty-eight countries.101 The Copenhagen Accord’s main goals were to
limit “climate change to no more than two degrees Celsius, [to establish]
systems of ‘pledge and review’ for mitigation commitments or actions by
both developed and developing countries, and [to identify] significant new
financial resources.”102 However, several countries, including Bolivia,
Sudan, and Venezuela, objected to the Accord, and thereby prevented the
Convention from formally adopting the agreement.103 Therefore, because the
Copenhagen Accord was simply a political agreement, the substantive pieces
of the Accord were never technically accepted.104
Another attempt to discuss and detail the Kyoto Protocol was recently
made at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Panama.105 This
meeting, which began on October 1, 2011, and culminated on October 7,
2011, was the last official Conference held before the annual Climate
Change Conference, which took place in Durban during November 2011.106
It resulted in very little headway and, according to commentators, “barely
made progress in resolving the thorniest issues, stalling negotiations to
conclude a global agreement later this year in Durban, South Africa to save
the planet from overheating.”107
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100
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http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop-15/summary (last visited June 30, 2012)
(noting how the outcome leaves uncertainty about the formal standing of the Copenhagen
Accord under the U.N. climate regime and about the nature of any future agreement).
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CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/panama_oct_2011/meeting/6247.php (last visited
June 29, 2012).
106
Financing Quarrels Mar UN Climate Talks in Panama, ENV’T NEWS SERV. (Oct. 7,
2011), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/oct2011/2011-10-07-02.html.
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PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/77626.
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A. COP 17: Durban, South Africa
A third meeting was held in Durban, South Africa at the seventeenth
meeting of the COP on November 28, 2011.108 The Conference’s aim was to
host “discussions . . . to advance, in a balanced fashion, the implementation
of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. . . .”109 Many saw the Conference
as the final opportunity “to ensure that internationally binding emission
reduction commitments with international rules and compliance continue and
do not lapse or end altogether.”110
The Durban Conference, unlike its predecessors, made some headway.
First, Durban officially launched the Green Climate Fund, originally
contemplated in the Copenhagen Accord, as an operating entity of the
Convention’s financial mechanism under Article 11.111 The fund’s purpose
is to help support various projects, policies, and activities in developing
countries.112 It is unclear, however, how the Green Climate Fund will be
funded as the Conference did not identify a means for financing.113 The final
version of the Green Climate Fund is to be detailed at the eighteenth COP.114
The Durban Conference also resulted in the Durban Platform, which
“legally require[s] all nations — including the two biggest emitters, China
and the United States — to meet as-yet-unspecified emissions targets.”115
The Durban Platform’s main aim was to initiate a process to develop a
Protocol that would legally bind all countries.116 The Platform, therefore,
envisions “a non-binding agreement to reach an agreement by 2015,” in
which both developing and developed countries have legally binding
obligations.117 Some critics, however, believe that the Durban Platform is
108
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Action, in United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28–Dec. 11,
2011, Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its 17th Sess.,
2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.
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not as significant a step as it appears to be but is simply legal jargon that will
delay any significant action for a number of years.118 It remains to be seen
how the world’s nations will structure this legal agreement, and if in fact
they will be able to agree to bind both developing and developed nations.
Perhaps most significantly, the Durban Conference also declared that a
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is set to begin in January
2013 and end in either December 2017 or December 2020.119 By thus
stating, the Durban Conference officially announced a second Kyoto
Protocol commitment period. However, the Conference did not change the
emission targets or the binding commitments for this second Kyoto Protocol
period but instead “renew[ed] . . . the fraying 1997 emissions agreement that
sets different terms for advanced and developing countries, for several more
years.”120 Therefore, this second commitment period is simply an extension
of the first, with no significant additions or edits.121
Thus, although the Durban Conference made some progress, it remains
highly debated whether the Conference was a success or simply another
example of the COP kicking the can down the road.122 Regardless, it seems
that the door has been left open for the formation of a new and restructured
Kyoto Protocol.
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?OpenElement.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Kyoto Protocol, although a good first step, is by no means a perfect
solution to the world’s greenhouse gas problem.123 The Protocol initiated a
process whereby countries could take note of their individual impact on the
global greenhouse gas levels and pledge to reduce that impact
appropriately.124 The Protocol also gave countries a new way to meet their
reductions targets by introducing three market-based mechanisms.125
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the Kyoto Protocol started a
necessary global conversation on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions and
what should be done about the problem.126
Despite all of the Kyoto Protocol’s contributions, a reinvigorated Protocol
will necessitate that countries address several very important issues. If these
issues are not addressed, the Protocol will fail and be rendered a useless
political agreement.
A. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
The first issue that must be discussed and decided is which countries
should be held responsible for reducing greenhouse gas emissions going
forward. Should the list of Annex I countries stay the same, or should more
countries be added? Most importantly, should the Protocol even discern
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries?
The Kyoto Protocol and its founding charter, the UNFCCC, currently
differentiate between member countries by using the common but
differentiated responsibilities principle.127 This principle begins with the
idea that “certain risks affect . . . every nation on earth . . . includ[ing] not
only [risks such as] the climate and the ozone . . . but [also] all risk-related
global public goods.”128 These risks are deemed to be common, as all
countries, regardless of development or economic prosperity, share them.129
The principle also dictates that regardless of these common risks the
responsibilities attributed to each nation should be differentiated: “not all
countries should contribute equally . . . [and] some nations . . . [should be
123
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commitment period relative to global emissions is projected to be limited”).
124
See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14.
125
Id. arts. 6, 12, 17.
126
See Bond, supra note 93 (noting various countries that participated in the Protocol).
127
Essential Background: Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18.
128
Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 276, 276–77 (2004).
129
Id.

236

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:219

charged] with carrying a greater burden than others.”130 A multi-national
agreement can implement this principle in multiple ways.131 For example, it
can allow some parties more time to implement certain measures, give them
special defenses, or turn a blind eye to areas of non-compliance.132
The Kyoto Protocol utilizes the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities in the latter manner. It does so by committing developed
countries to binding reductions of their greenhouse gas emissions, while
simply urging developing countries to reduce their emissions, thereby
effectively overlooking a developing country’s non-compliance.133 The
justification for this principle stems from the idea that historically not only
have developed countries contributed more to the climate change problem,
but they also have greater capabilities to address the problem.134 In contrast,
developing countries have not been emitting greenhouse gases for as long a
period of time, as they have taken longer to develop and industrialize their
economies.135 Additionally, due to this lag in industrialization, developing
countries lack the economic and technological resources to deal with the
greenhouse emissions problem.136 Therefore, the justification concludes that
developed countries should shoulder a greater portion of the greenhouse gas
reduction burden, as historically they have contributed exponentially more to
the greenhouse gas emission problem and they have the funds to make the
problem better.137
Another reason used to support the application of the common but
differentiated principle is that if developing countries are bound to
greenhouse gas targets, implementing this obligation will severely burden
their economies.138 Developing countries worry that if they take on
substantial environmental obligations under the Kyoto Protocol these
obligations will come at the expense of economic development as they will
need to utilize precious financial resources to build environmentally friendly
infrastructures, rather than invest them in building up their economies.139
130
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The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm illustrated one of the first uses of this reasoning when the
Conference stated in its final declaration that:
[i]n . . . developing countries . . . [m]illions continue to live far
below the minimum levels required for a decent human
existence . . . [t]herefore, the developing countries must direct
their efforts to development . . . [while] industrialized countries
should make efforts to reduce the gap [for] themselves and the
developing countries.140
By making this statement, the Conference adhered to the notion that
developing countries should simply worry about their economic development
and deal with their environmental impact as a secondary and much later
issue.141 In contrast, developed countries should step in and “take the lead in
combating climate change,” and do so not only for themselves but for
developing countries as well.142
This unequal burden, justified by historical levels of emissions, has
therefore been incorporated into environmental agreements and conferences
from the UNFCCC to the Copenhagen Conference to the Kyoto Protocol.
However, questions remain. How long should these differentiated
responsibilities last? Is this burden to be carried indefinitely? Or, does it
ultimately expire as time goes on and developing economies begin to
produce more greenhouse gas emissions?
There are also several strong rationales espoused against utilizing this
principle, especially in an environmental agreement such as the Kyoto
Protocol. The first argument against using this principle targets the notion
that binding obligations for developing countries will somehow unduly
burden their economic development. That notion arguably places too large
of an emphasis on the economic concerns involved, and does so at the
expense of environmental ones.143 By placing more emphasis on the
considered” and that there should be varied obligations for different states “taking into
account their . . . ability to respond, prevent, reduce, or control the identified threat”).
140
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1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, para. 4,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972) (citation omitted), available at http://www.un
ep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503.
141
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142
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Michael Weisslitz, Note, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common But Differentiated
Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the
Global Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 473, 489 (2002).
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economies of these developing countries, instead of their environments, the
international community is disregarding the gravity of the global warming
problem and allowing developing countries to pollute in favor of their
economies.144 Under this view, a focus on the environment is as important, if
not more so, than a focus on the economy and its development.145
Additionally, this argument emphasizes that “[b]y placing economic
concerns ahead of environmental ones, the international community is
ignoring the severity of the current global warming crisis,” which will
ultimately have a net adverse effect on all countries.146
Another case for not implementing the common but differentiated
responsibilities principle is that studies have predicted that in the future it
will be the developing countries that will cause much of the greenhouse gas
emission damage.147 In fact, “[e]missions growth rates are highest among
developing countries . . . , where collectively CO2 emissions increased by
forty-seven percent over the 1990–2002 period.”148 In stark contrast, over
the same time period, carbon dioxide emissions remained constant in
developed countries149 Although this number is slightly misleading since
some developed countries, like the United States and Australia, have actually
increased their carbon dioxide emissions, the overall change for the
developed countries was still a net neutral.150 This lack of growth illustrates
that focusing exclusively on developed countries would not be effective, as it
is the developing countries whose greenhouse gas emissions are
exponentially increasing.
Another reason advocated against the common but differentiated
responsibilities principle, particularly against its implementation in the Kyoto
Protocol, is that it at its most extreme it incentivizes developing countries to
ignore their greenhouse gas emissions completely or, at the very least, it
encourages them to not make emissions reduction a priority.151 By not
requiring any commitment from the developing countries, the Kyoto
Protocol “licenses a continuing wrong, allowing developing states to
structure their industr[ies] in environmentally unfriendly and fossil fuelreliant directions.”152 The main concern is that developing countries will use
144
145
146
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148
149
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152
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the leeway afforded to them by the Kyoto Protocol to not only further emit
greenhouse gases but also, and perhaps more significantly, create permanent
infrastructures that are fueled by carbon and prolong this problem for
generations to come.153 However, if under a new Kyoto regime developing
countries are required to abide by binding greenhouse emissions then they
may be incentivized to build clean energy sources from the start, forcing
them to address the greenhouse gas problem at its root.
As a result of the changing situation in developing countries, the Kyoto
Protocol’s focus on developing versus developed countries is no longer
realistic. The common but differentiated responsibilities principle, which the
Kyoto Protocol utilizes in order to commit developed countries to binding
targets while allowing developing countries to continue unhindered, cannot
be maintained. In a world where China and India are two of the largest
greenhouse gas emitters, and where eleven of the top twenty-five gas
emitters are non-Annex I countries,154 this common but differentiated
responsibilities principle simply exacerbates the greenhouse gas problem and
hinders the development of a legitimate solution.
Thus, by allowing the common but differentiated responsibilities
principle to control simply because there is a belief that “developed countries
[should] acknowledge the responsibility that they bear . . . in view of the
pressures their societies place on the global environment,” the Protocol is not
addressing a large source of the greenhouse emission problem.155 China and
India, along with the United States, the European Union, and Russia account
for about 61% of greenhouse emissions.156 Of these five major greenhouse
gas emitters, only India and China are left out of the binding obligations
scheme due to the common but differentiated responsibilities principle,157
while the United States will not ratify the Protocol because of the fact that
large developing countries are not bound by the Protocol.158
By not including developing countries that are emitting large levels of
greenhouse gases from its binding mechanism, the Protocol will likely never
make a significant impact on greenhouse gas emissions and, therefore, will
fail in its purpose. Similar observations have prompted organizations such as
153
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the World Resource Institute (WRI), a well regarded environmental think
tank,159 to insist that “it is simply not possible to adequately address the
climate change problem without engaging both developed and developing
countries.”160
The developing-versus-developed issue was also at the forefront of
discussions at the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in
Copenhagen, Denmark.161 At this Fifteenth session of the COP, developed
and developing nations disagreed when discussing whether developing
countries should take on more vigorous and perhaps binding emission
targets.162 The United States and other developed countries demanded that
developing countries take on reporting and measurement obligations, while
large developing economies such as China expressly rejected such
demands.163
Although no concrete agreement was reached at Copenhagen,164 the
discussions held made it evident that the United States and other developed
countries are not willing to sign on to an international environmental
agreement that requires them to shoulder all the binding responsibilities of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.165 This reluctance and the fact that the
world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States, is unwilling to sign
a new environmental agreement without the binding commitment of
developing countries is an additional incentive to bind developing
countries.166
At the Seventeenth COP in Durban, South Africa this issue came up
again. Despite the European Union’s attempts to push “for . . . a ‘road map’
to a legally binding treaty, [they met] against fierce resistance from China
and India, whose delegates argued passionately against it . . . [stating] that
mandatory cuts would slow their growth and condemn millions to
poverty.”167 Eventually, developing and developed countries seemed to
agree that all nations should be bound; however, this agreement was not
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binding, but was simply an “agreement to agree” at a future date.168
Therefore, the agreement allows countries like China to potentially stall until
2020 before being legally bound by the treaty.169
Thus, although the Kyoto Protocol is to be renewed in January 2013, this
second commitment period will not change the common but differentiated
responsibilities principle but will allow developing countries to continue
evading legally binding obligations.170 A new Kyoto Protocol must equalize
the burdens between developed and developing nations in order to be
effective. Not only would such equalization ensure that the Protocol makes a
significant impact by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but it would also
ensure that heavily emitting developed countries are incentivized to sign-on.
In fact, “[t]he United States never ratified the agreement because . . . [the
Protocol] doesn't require any action from the developing world . . . [t]he
Bush administration considered that a fatal flaw . . . [a]nd so does the Obama
White House.”171 Additionally, the European Union, as evidenced in
Durban, seems intent on getting a legally binding commitment for all
nations.172 Furthermore, three of the major countries that signed the initial
commitment, Japan, Russia and Canada, have refused to commit to a second
period unless China and the United States are held to binding commitments
as well.173 Therefore, in order to incentivize the United States as well as the
European Union to join the Kyoto Protocol regime, the common but
differentiated responsibilities doctrine must be done away with. Doing away
with this doctrine would, in turn, result in China and India being bound,
thereby incentivizing Japan, Canada, and most importantly Russia, to sign on
to another commitment period.174
By eliminating its common but
differentiated responsibilities principle and simply focusing on binding
targets for the top twenty-five greenhouse gas emitters, this new Kyoto
Protocol would then include those countries that “contribute approximately
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61 percent of global emissions.”175 These changes would put a new Kyoto
Protocol on the right path to effective reduction of emissions.
The top greenhouse gas emitters must be bound to a new Kyoto regime,
as organizations such as the WRI have found that the top twenty-five
emitters generate 83% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, with the
remaining countries only generating 17%.176 Therefore, in order to tackle a
significant portion of the problem, a new Kyoto Protocol must require, at a
minimum, that the top twenty-five greenhouse gas emitters adhere to binding
targets.
Admittedly, eliminating this principle may be harder than it seems. The
Kyoto Protocol is linked to the UNFCCC, which also espouses the common
but differentiated responsibilities principle.177 Therefore, although it is
outside the scope of this Note, an additional issue to consider may be an
amendment to the UNFCCC. This Note will proceed under the assumption
that amending the UNFCCC is possible.
B. Funding Issue
Although developing countries should take on a more serious obligation
under a new Kyoto Protocol framework and do away with the common but
differentiated responsibilities principle, some remnants of the principle will
inevitably need to be retained as developing and developed countries have
different access to resources. Historically, developed countries have
contributed more to the environmental issues that are present today.178
Nevertheless, developed countries should not be forever obligated to take the
lead and thereby be forced to combat climate change for themselves as well
as for developing countries.179 In order to address these competing
rationales, there must be some sort of compromise.
Perhaps the most fair and effective way to deal with this historical
conundrum is to move forward by binding developing as well as developed
countries to greenhouse gas emission targets. However, in recognition of the
burden this would place on the economies of the developing world, a new
Protocol should also obligate developed countries to help finance the
necessary infrastructures in developing nations in order to help make these
binding obligations feasible.
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Upon application of binding targets, many developing countries may have
trouble abiding by their greenhouse gas emission goals “due to limited
economic means, lack of technological know-how, and insufficient
infrastructure.”180 Thus, their biggest concern may be balancing their
tentative economic development while still taking into account
environmental concerns.181 In a new Kyoto framework, developing countries
can make their adherence to binding targets “conditional on the receipt of
assistance from developed countries.”182 Maintaining this aspect of the
common but differentiated responsibilities principle, while still binding both
developed and developing countries, allows developed countries to share
their environmental burden while helping developing countries shoulder their
new financial burden.
In recognition of the new burden being allotted to developing countries,
developed countries can assist by contributing to a fund managed by an
official of the Kyoto Protocol. This fund will funnel the necessary resources
to those developing countries that require them, and be managed by the
UNFCCC, with some oversight by the donating country in order to allow
assurance that their investment is being used appropriately. This form of
assistance should thereby help to alleviate some of the economic concerns of
developing nations, by helping them build clean energy infrastructures
without greatly hampering their economic development.
The Copenhagen Accord, the political agreement of the Copenhagen
Conference, envisioned a similar financial solution.183 The Accord included
several financial elements: (1) a “collective commitment by developed
countries . . . to provide new and additional resources . . . approaching USD
30 billion”; (2) a longer term commitment by developed countries “to a goal
of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020”; and (3) a
Copenhagen Green Climate fund, which would be the “operating entity of
the [Convention’s] financial mechanism.”184
All of these funding
mechanisms were to be tied to actions showing meaningful mitigation of
greenhouse gas emissions by the developing country receiving assistance.185
However, because the Copenhagen Accord was never adopted by a
consensus, and was simply taken note of, it is not a legally binding
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instrument.186
Therefore, none of its recommendations were ever
187
implemented.
The solution conceived of in the Copenhagen Accord could and should be
implemented in a reinvigorated Kyoto Protocol. One major advantage of this
solution is it would likely have significant buy-in as the Copenhagen Accord
was drafted by a group of about twenty-eight countries, including all of the
major economies of the world.188 Additionally, “114 countries . . . associated
themselves with the . . . Accord” and seventy-three of those countries,
“representing more than 80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions,”
pledged to limit their emissions.189 Thus, a funding solution dictated by the
Copenhagen Accord likely has the backing and support of numerous
countries, including the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters.190
All countries involved in the Copenhagen Accord discussions agreed that
developing countries would need assistance in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions; however, developing and developed countries envisioned this
funding differently.191 Developed countries believed that any financial
assistance should be “linked to developing country mitigation
commitments,” while developing countries believed that this funding was
“payment of the ‘carbon debt’ that . . . developed countries owe[d] for their
historical emissions.”192 However, despite this difference, the funding
solution that eventually developed was in fact linked to mitigation action by
the developing countries, demonstrating that there was eventually a
consensus on the issue.193 Therefore, as over one hundred countries
associated themselves with the Accord, and all the major economies were
involved in drafting it, a solution contained within the Accord would likely
have more buy-in than one created completely from scratch.194
Another indication that a Copenhagen Accord-like solution would have
significant buy-in is the decision to formally establish a Green Climate Fund
at the Durban Conference.195 At the Durban Conference, countries
“designate[d] the Green Climate Fund as an operating entity of the financial
186

Summary: Copenhagen Climate Summit, supra note 104.
Id.
188
Bodansky, supra note 101, at 230.
189
Id. at 231.
190
Id. (noting that the EU, United States, Japan, Russia, China, and India all associated
themselves with the Accord).
191
Id. at 237.
192
Id.
193
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 97, art. 8.
194
See Bodansky, supra note 101, at 231 (listing nations willing to associate with the Accord).
195
See Launching the Green Climate Fund, supra note 19, para. 3 (establishing Green
Climate Fund).
187

2012]

LET THEM EAT CARBON

245

mechanism of the Convention, in accordance with Article 11 of the
Convention, with arrangements to be concluded between the Conference of
the Parties and the Fund at the eighteenth session of the [c]onference of the
Parties.”196 However, although the Conference officially made the Green
Climate Fund part of its financial mechanism, it did not designate how the
Green Climate Fund would be funded.197 The Conference simply established
that developed countries would “boost funding for developing countries to
US$100 billion annually by 2020.”198
Therefore, although a fund was established, it remains to be determined
how the Green Climate Fund will be financed. Should the funding come
exclusively from developed countries? Or should private sources also be
used? One solution to this problem has already been contemplated in the
Kyoto Protocol, via the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund.199 This Fund,
developed during the Marrakesh Accords, “was established to finance
concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing country [p]arties
to the Kyoto Protocol,” with financing to come from a “share of proceeds on
the clean development mechanism project activities . . . amount[ing] to 2%
of . . . [CERs] issued for a CDM project activity.”200 The idea of financing
by using a percentage of CER’s issued per CDM project could be leveraged
and utilized when funding the Green Climate Fund as well.
Therefore, by implementing the Green Climate Fund solution crafted in
the Copenhagen and Durban Conferences, and financing the fund not only
via mandatory and voluntary contributions from developed countries, but
also via a share of the proceeds of CDM projects, the new Kyoto Protocol
would incentivize both developed and developing countries to sign a new
commitment. A new Kyoto Protocol should also follow the lead of the
Copenhagen Accord by linking the receipt of funding to significant
mitigation action from any developing country receiving assistance, which
can shown by them taking on binding greenhouse gas commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol.
In taking a harder stance on developing countries, the new Protocol would
garner greater buy-in from developed countries that have expressed
dissatisfaction with this issue in the past. The Protocol could, however,
simultaneously incentivize developing countries to sign on by providing
196
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them with the necessary financial assistance to meet their binding goals and
thereby showing them that the world understands the difficulties they face in
meeting their commitments.
C. Measures to Reduce Emissions and Market-Based Mechanisms
Another issue that has arisen, mostly between developed countries, is how
countries should adhere to their binding emissions targets. Should they
primarily implement national measures? Or should they take full advantage
of the mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol?
The Kyoto Protocol affords Annex I countries multiple ways to meet their
binding greenhouse gas emission targets. It recommends national measures
that countries can take in Article 2(1)(a) of the Protocol.201 It also allows
Annex-I countries to meet their targets via three market-based mechanisms:
the clean development mechanism (CDM), the emissions trading
mechanism, and the joint implementation mechanism.202 The Kyoto
Protocol, however, is careful to limit these market-based solutions. In
detailing its emissions trading and joint implementation mechanisms, the
Protocol explicitly states that these mechanisms are supplemental to national
measures for the purpose of meeting binding commitments.203 This concept
of “supplementarity” stands for the idea that the “investor country has to
pursue an independent climate policy apart from . . . [these market-based]
measures,” and therefore cannot exclusively rely on these measures to meet
its targets.204
Although not limited in the text of the Protocol itself, the CDM was also
made supplemental to national measures in the Marrakesh Accords.205 In its
Addendum to the Report of the Marrakesh Accords, the COP clarified that
under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which details the CDM, use of the
mechanism is to be supplemental to national measures, and that national
measures should not only be used first, but must be the most significant
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portion of the mitigation action taken.206 Consequently, because non-Annex
I countries are not held to binding commitments, the Marrakesh Accords
only held Annex I countries to this supplementarity criterion. It did not
restrict those states hosting the CDM projects to this criterion, thus leaving
the supplementarity criterion as a restriction upon only developed
countries.207 This oversight thus allows developing countries to take
advantage of CDM-based projects without first being bound to utilize
national measures to reduce their own emissions.
The issue of supplementarity was also heavily discussed during the
Copenhagen Conference, where there was a split between developed
countries as to which methods should be used most aggressively going
forward.208 The European Union member states pushed for emissions
reduction via domestic measures while the “United States . . . [and] Australia
and Japan[ ] push[ed] for the unrestricted use of market-based
mechanisms.”209
The argument that countries should utilize primarily domestic measures
and minimize use of the Kyoto Protocol’s market-based mechanisms stems
from the idea that allowing developed countries to use CDM projects and
other such mechanisms to meet their targets “can be at odds with the
principle of joint but differentiated responsibility, which requires
that . . . states . . . enact climate policies at home.”210 By allowing developed
countries to reduce their emissions via certified emission reduction units,
some argue that the countries are not reducing their own emissions, as
dictated in the Kyoto Protocol, but are in fact “distort[ing] the wording and
original goal of the provision.”211
However, there are also strong arguments in support of market-based
mechanisms, and specifically of the CDM. By allowing developed countries
to fund projects in developing countries and receive credits for their funding
the CDM helps with two aspects of climate change: “industrialized
economies can fund environment-friendly projects in an effort to receive
carbon credits . . . [and] developing countries [can] support their economies
in a sustainable way because of the funding from industrialized countries.”212
The CDM is seen as the best way to encourage developing countries to
reduce emissions while also helping them promote sustainable
206
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209
210
211
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development.213 Furthermore, the CDM allows both developed and
developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in a more
cost-effective manner, thereby making adherence to binding obligations
easier and more cost-effective.214
The CDM system would, of course inevitably change if developed and
developing nations had binding obligations, in that all of them would have an
incentive to utilize the mechanism to offset their emissions in order to meet
their binding targets. However, the CDM could still work in such an
environment, and would arguably work more cohesively within the new
Kyoto framework.
For example, a country like the United States, which would already be
contributing to a fund in order to help developing countries build clean
infrastructures, would register a CDM project in a developing country like
India. This project, if approved, would give the United States carbon
certified emission reductions and contribute to their emission reduction
goals.215 Additionally, a percentage of these certified emission reduction
credits would go to help fund the Green Climate Fund.216 This project,
however, would also assist the developing nation in this example. India, via
this CDM project, would have an emission-reducing project implemented in
its country, a project that would effectively reduce India’s greenhouse gas
emissions, thus making India’s compliance goals easier to fulfill, and
promoting sustainable development in the country. Additionally, India
would receive funding to build further clean energy sources from the
percentage of CERs contributed to the Green Climate Fund from that CDM
project. Thus, India would receive financing as well as a clean-energy CDM
project to help it meet its new binding emissions targets.
In a world where both developing and developed countries have binding
obligations, the CDM would ensure not only that the developed nation could
meet its greenhouse gas emission targets, but also that it would assist
developing nations in doing so by implementing projects with clean energy
sources.
Additionally, if both developed and developing countries are committed
to binding targets, the concept of supplementarity would no longer apply
only to developed nations.217 The developing nation would have to
implement national measures first, and do so before utilizing the emission
213
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reductions generated from CDM projects. Therefore, the concept of
supplementarity would apply to developing countries in the inverse.
Although the CDM project would technically be within the developing
country’s borders, they would have to implement other national measures,
unrelated to market-based mechanisms, first. By this means, the new Kyoto
Protocol would ensure that developing and developed countries were both
implementing national measures before taking advantage of market-based
mechanisms like the CDM.
Consequently, if a new Protocol puts a stringent cap on the amount of
reductions allowed via market-based mechanisms, such as the CDM, it
would make the cost of adherence to greenhouse gas targets higher for both
developed and developing nations, as the CDM mechanism provides
monetary benefits for both developed and developing nations..218 Therefore,
because one of the major concerns for developing nations in committing to
binding targets is that they cannot commit the necessary resources to the
climate change problem, limiting such a cost-effective method would be
counter-productive in incentivizing them to commit.219 Additionally, if a cap
were placed on the amount of reductions allowed via the CDM this would
hinder financing for the Green Climate Fund, part of which would come
from a percentage of the certified emission reduction credits.220 Thus, the
more CDM projects, the more credits, and the more funding provided.
Therefore, although undoubtedly, an unfettered use of market-based
mechanisms would run afoul of the Protocol’s purpose to have countries
reduce their own emissions, putting a stringent cap on the CDM would not
only result in higher costs for developing countries, but would also hinder
funding for these countries.
VI. CONCLUSION: A NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT IS NECESSARY
Climate change is a global issue that requires a global commitment.
Studies predict that if greenhouse gas emissions continue as they are “the
global average surface temperature is expected to rise by 0.2°C to 0.4°C per
decade throughout the 21st century and would continue to rise thereafter.
The cumulative warming by 2100 would [thus] be approximately 3°C
218
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to 5°C. . . .”221 This will result in more than just an increase in day-to-day
temperatures. It will shift climate zones, destroy forests, endanger
ecosystems such as mountains and wetlands, result in a surge of diseases,
and affect agricultural and fishery production, thus resulting in the risk of
famine.222 These drastic effects require that the world come together to
design a global solution that will not only be acceptable to both developing
and developed countries but also be effective at fighting global warming.
Such a solution demands that the common but differentiated
responsibilities principle is not utilized in a reinvigorated Kyoto Protocol.
This change to the Protocol would necessitate that the top twenty-five
greenhouse gas emitters, whether they be developed or developing countries,
contribute equally to reducing emissions by committing to binding
greenhouse gas targets.
At the same time, an effective global agreement requires that developed
nations, who have stronger economies and have historically contributed more
to the climate change problem, help their developing country brothers by
funding clean infrastructures in those countries. Funding can be managed
via the Green Climate Fund, which is now part of the financial mechanism of
the Kyoto Protocol. Financing for the fund would come from voluntary and
mandatory contributions from developed countries, as well as from a
percentage of the CER credits of CDM projects. Additionally, to ensure that
both developed and developing nations are willing to commit, mechanisms
like the CDM cannot be strictly capped as they provide the most costeffective way to meet binding emissions targets.
If these issues are addressed, and the interests of both developed and
developing nations are balanced, a new Kyoto Protocol would present a
viable solution to the climate change problem. However, if, like at the
Durban Conference, nations continue to kick the can down the road and
simply make agreements to agree, the problem of greenhouse gas emissions
and global warming will only become more pervasive in the future.
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